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CHAPTER 11 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§1I.I. Special statutory standing to sue: Equal protection and 
welfare of the Commonwealth. Paddock v. Town of Brookline1 was 
a case in which the "procedural" question of standing to litigate the 
constitutionality of a statute was uniquely intertwined with the "sub-
stantive" question of the validity of the statute. The plaintiff de-
clared upon a claim for damages for injuries caused by a defect in a 
public way.2 She had failed, however, to give the town the statutory 
noticeS of the defect and the injury. A sympathetic legislature enacted 
a special statute4 authorizing her to maintain her action, notwithstand-
ing her failure to give notice. The defendant town contended, suc-
cessfully, that the statute was invalid and of no effect. 
The Court, relying principally upon the early case of Holden v. 
James/,' ruled that the special statute was violative of the state consti-
tution6 in that it "purports to exempt a named individual from the 
obligations of a general law while allowing the general law to remain 
in full force and effect as to all other persons .... "7 Other cases8 in 
which special exemptions from, or exceptions to, provisions of general 
laws were sustained were distinguished on the ground that they in-
volved exercise of the "parental" power of the Commonwealth by 
making provision for administration of the property of specific infants 
or other incompetents.1I 
The constitutional prohibition of inequality of treatment is not a 
legal abstraction to be enforced in a doctrinaire manner. As the Court 
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The author wishes .to acknowledge the assistance of Dwight W. Miller, of the 
Board of Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY, in the preparation of this chapter. 
§11.1. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. SOl, 197 N.E.2d !l21. 
2 G.L., c. 84, §15. 
SId. §§18, 19. 
4 Acts of 1960, c. 519. 
1\ 11 Mass. !l96 (1814). 
6 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X: "Each individual of the society 
has a right to be proteoted by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, 
according to standing laws." 
7 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. SOl, 507, 197 N.E.2d !l21, !l25. 
8 Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Metc. !l88 (1844); Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass. !l26 (1820). 
111964 Mass. Adv. Sh. SOl, 507, 197 N.E.2d 1121, !l25. 
1
O'Reilly: Chapter 11: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1964
§ll.l CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117 
indicated in a footnote,10 there is much special legislation, such as 
pensions for public employees, validations of acts of notaries public, 
and payments of moral claims against the sovereign, which confers 
benefits upon individuals who would be entitled to nothing under 
the general law. In these cases, however, the benefits to the favored 
individuals do not involve corresponding detriments to others. Thus, 
it became necessary in the present case to determine whether the 
special exemption which the legislature had given Paddock imposed 
upon the defendant town a burden of which it could rightfully com-
plain. The Court resolved this issue in the affirmative, taking the 
position that the giving of notice is an integral part of the cause of 
action for injuries resulting from a defect in a public way, so that a 
particularized exemption from the normal requirement of I;lotice 
would subject the town to a liability not imposed upon it by the 
general law. 
The standing of governmental entities to challenge the validity of 
legislation is a point on which subtle distinctions are sometimes made. 
On the one hand, the United States has been heard to litigate the 
question of whether an act of Congress violates the constitutional 
separation of powers,11 and a state has been heard to contest the 
constitutionality of part of the enabling act which admitted it to the 
Union.12 On the other hand, it seems definitely settled that a munici-
pal corporation will not be heard to cont.end that a state statute is in 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.13 It "has no privi-
leges or immunities which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its 
creator."14 However, the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting 
in review of a decision of a lower federal court, will hear a municipality 
in challenge to a state statute on the ground of conflict with the state 
constitution.IIi In the Paddock case the defendant town made no 
claim based upon the Federal Constitution. 
The Massachusetts case law has rested on distinctions based on the 
conventional, but frequently baffiing, difference between "proprietary" 
and "sovereign" functions of a municipality. Thus, while a political 
subdivision of the state may not contest the validity of a statute 
transferring its assets and functions to another public agency, or even 
10Id. at 508. 197 N.E.2d at 326. 
11 Myers v. United States. 272 U.S. 52. 47 Sup. Ct. 21. 7I L. Ed. 160 (1926). 
12 Coyle v. Oklahoma. 221 U.S. 559. 31 Sup. Ct. 688. 55 L. Ed. 853 (1911). And 
see Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Cleary. 296 U.S. 315. 56 Sup. Ct. 235. 
80 L. Ed. 251 (1935). 
18 Columbus and Greenville Ry. v. Miller. 283 U.S. 96. 51 Sup. Ct. 392. 75 L. Ed. 
861 (1931); Trenton v. New Jersey. 262 U.S. 182. 43 Sup. Ct. 534. 67 L. Ed. 937 
(1923); Newark v. New Jersey. 262 U.S. 192. 43 Sup. Ct. 539. 67 L. Ed. 943 (1923); 
Braxton County Court v. West Virginia. 208 U.S. 192. 28 Sup. Ct. 275. 52 L. Ed. 
450 (1908). 
14 Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore. 289 U.S. 36. 40. 53 Sup. Ct. 431. 434. 77 L. 
Ed. 1015. 1018 (1933). 
15 Ibid. 
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of a statute abolishing it,ltl it does have standing to challenge a statute 
which would transfer, without compensation, its cemetery property 
to a private corporation.1'1 This is because the status of the city as to 
the cemetery is that of "proprietor." 
In Paddock the proprietor-sovereign distinction was not used. 
Rather the Court pointed to the constitutional provisionl8 which 
authorizes the legislature "to make ... all manner of wholesome and 
reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances ... as they shall judge 
to be for the good and welfare of this commonwealth .... " The 
Court read the latter clause as a limitation of the legislative power, 
at least as it is used to regulate municipalities. Since the Court was 
unable to perceive any public good accomplished by the special statute 
in favor of the plaintiff, it concluded that the statute was invalid. 
It is difficult to perceive how interpretation of a constitutional pro-
vision as a limitation upon legislative power establishes the standing 
of the defendant to raise the point in a litigated case. It is even more 
difficult to picture the future impact upon the scope of judicial review 
of legislation of the concept that the validity of legislation may be 
determined by a court's judgment as to whether it is for the good and 
welfare of the Commonwealth.l9 
§11.2. Arrest: Search and seizure: Warrant. "In the current swift 
pace of constitutional change,"l it is becoming increasingly urgent that 
guidelines be laid down for police and other officials to follow in the 
process of law enforcement, particularly in the area of the criminal 
law. The contour of one such line was etched in Commonwealth v. 
Lehan.2 
At about 11 o'clock one evening two police officers in a patrol car 
saw Lehan walking "rapidly," carrying two large boxes. His coat 
pockets "bulged." One of the officers recognized him as a person 
whom he had been assigned to watch for three years earlier in con-
nection with housebreaks in the neighborhood. The officers asked 
him what he was carrying, and he replied that it was "stuff" belong-
ing to his wife. Asked where he was going with it, he replied that he 
had had a disagreement with his wife, had left her, and was going to 
a room. He was then asked why he did not take shaving gear and 
other effects of his own, rather than his wife's goods. He gave no 
16Weymouth Be Braintree Fire DIst. v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, lOS 
Mass. 142 (1871). 
1'1 Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N.E. 
695 (1893). 
18 Mass. Const., Part Second, c. I, §I, Art. IV. 
19 Compare the announced view of Justice Kirk, the author of the Paddock 
opinion, in dissent in Molesworth v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1964 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. lUll; 200 N.E.2d 264, brie8.y noted in §1l.6 infra. There the dissenters 
held .that the recitals in an "emergency" preamble to a statute present no justiciable 
question. 
§1l.2. 1 Mr. Justice Harlan, in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 4, 84 Sup. 
Ot. 80, 82, 11 L. Ed. 2d 41, 43 (196!!) (dissenting opinion). 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 196 N.E.2d 840. 
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satisfactory answer, and the officers opened the packages and found 
that they contained a hair dryer and similar articles. They then 
asked Lehan to accompany them to his wife's house, and he acquiesced. 
(One officer testified that if he had not gone with them they would 
have placed him under arrest.) The wife told one of the officers that 
there had been no disagreement between her husband and herself, and 
that the contents of the boxes were not her property. The officers 
then formally placed Lehan "under arrest" and took him to the 
police station. About 12:30 A.M. word came to the police station of 
a burglary in which the articles Lehan had been carrying had been 
stolen. Lehan's pockets were emptied (the record being unclear as 
to whether this took place when the officers first spoke to him, or after 
he was brought to the police station) and were found to have contained 
jewelry and cosmetics stolen during the burglary, along with a file 
and a screw driver. The victim of the burglary notified the police 
that a sewing machine had also been stolen. Lehan volunteered to 
lead the police to his back yard, where the machine was found hidden 
under a porch. 
In reviewing Lehan's conviction for breaking and entering and for 
possession of burglarious implements, the Court for the first time 
applied the concept of a detention by the police which amounts to 
less than an arrest. Clearly, when the officers first saw Lehan they 
had no probable cause to believe either that a felony had been com-
mitted or that Lehan had committed one. At most, they had reason 
to suspect him of "unlawful design."B In the circumstances, ruled the 
Court, the officers had the right, under the statute,4 to stop the suspect 
and at least make "a brief threshold inquiry."1> Such inquiry may 
be pursued to an undetermined extent if the responses given are un-
satisfactory. The detention and questioning do not amount to a 
technical arrest, but are classified as a permissible part of official in-
vestigation into actual or possible crime. The Court6 treated the 
statute, at least to the extent that it permits "threshold inquiry," as 
a restatement of the powers of the New England night watch, which 
are again restated by part of the Uniform Arrest Act.7 A few weeks 
B G.L., c. 41, §98: "During the night time .•. [police officen] may examine all 
persons abroad whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may 
demand of them their business abroad and whither they are going . . .. Persons 
so suspected who do not give a satisfaotory account of themselves ... may be 
arrested by the police, and may thereafter be safely kept by imprisonment or other-
wise unless released in ,the manner provided by law, and taken before a distriot 
court to be examined and prosecuted." 
4 Ibid. 
I> 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 458, 196 N .E.2d 840, 845. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Section 2 of this Act provides: "(I) a peace officer may stop any person abroad 
who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed. or is about 
to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad 
and whither he is going. (2) Any Ferson so questioned who fails to identify him-
self or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and 
further questioned and investigated. (3) The total period of detention provided 
4
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later, the New York Court of Appeals, in dealing with a similar {actual 
situation, asserted that detention and inquiry on suspicion not amount-
ing to probable cause are practices sanctioned by the common law.S 
Under this theory the Court concluded that the defendant's motion 
to suppress the packages and their contents as evidence need not be 
allowed on the basis of their having been seized incident to an unlaw-
ful arrest. There was nothing unlawful about the "threshold in-
quiry." But, on the other hand, there was no arrest, so that the 
officers' seizure and search of the packages could not be justified as 
having been incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, if the seizure was 
without the consent of the defendant, suppression should have been 
ordered. 
The case leaves many questions unanswered. What of the right of 
the officers to "frisk" the suspect to determine if he is carrying a con-
cealed weapon which might be used against the officers? (The Court 
held that the emptying of Lehan's pockets, if it took place in the 
street, would be an unreasonable seizure. However, it was held that 
after talking with Lehan's wife the officers had probable cause, so 
that the arrest of Lehan was lawful, and the emptying of the pockets, 
if it took place in the police station, could be justified as a seizure 
incident to a lawful arrest.) What if Lehan had refused to accompany 
the officers to his wife's house? What if Lehan had declined to respond 
to inquiries, or had given answers which the officers regarded as un-
satisfactory? The statute recites that in case the person involved fails 
to give a satisfactory account, he may be arrested, imprisoned, and 
prosecuted. Does this amount to making a substantive crime of 
refusing to respond, or responding unsatisfactorily, to threshold in-
quiries? Such an interpretation would raise extremely serious ques-
tions of constitutionality. The Uniform Arrest Act places a two-hour 
limitation on the police right of threshold inquiry. Whether some 
comparable limitation will be supplied by judicial gloss remains to 
be seen. 
On the rest of the Lehan case, the rulings of the Court fell within 
a conventional pattern. After their conversation with the wife (and 
independently of any illegality involved in the inspection of the 
packages) the police had probable cause to support an arrest for 
larceny. Any searches and seizures incident to that arrest were lawful, 
and it was for the trier of fact to determine whether the emptying of 
Lehan's pockets was so incident. Likewise, it was for the trier of fact 
to determine whether the disclosure of the hiding place of the sewing 
machine was voluntary or the result of unlawful compulsion.9 
for by this section shall not exceed two hours. The detention is not an arrest and 
shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the deten-
tion the person so detained shall be released, or be arrested and charged with a 
crime." 
8 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964). 
II 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 463·464, 196 N.E.2d 840, 847. Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, 180 N.E.2d 673 (1962). 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 
11.7. 21.6. . 
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Other decisions handed down during the 1964 SURVEY year seem to 
make it clear that the Court is disposed to adhere, generally, to the 
orthodox law of arrest. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Mekalian10 a 
police officer saw the defendant, at a dog-racing track, receiving a bet 
from another officer, making a note on a racing sheet, and later, paying 
off on the bet to the other officer. The defendant was thereupon ar-
rested by the first officer and searched. His pockets contained a sum 
of money, which he admitted was the proceeds of his betting activities 
at the track. In a prosecution for illegal betting11 the Court ruled 
that the evidence should have been suppressed, because it was obtained 
by a search incident to an unlawful arrest. An officer's right to arrest 
without warrant for misdemeanor is still limited, as it traditionally 
has been, to cases of misdemeanor which involve breach of the peace. 
The offense with which the defendant was charged is not one which 
involves this breach. In Commonwealth v. McDermott12 an arrest 
for the same offense and seizure of the betting slips were sustained 
precisely because there was a warrant for the arrest and sei.zure. 
In the McDermott case, however, the Court did not come to grips 
with the question of the sufficiency of the description in the warrant 
of the person or persons to be arrested. The warrant,13 after describ-
ing the premises, authorized the arrest of "all persons who are there 
found participating in any form of gaming, and all persons present, 
whether so participating or not, if any ... apparatus or materials of 
any form of gaming are found in said place." The ruling of the 
Court appears to be that when the police saw McDermott registering 
a bet and in possession of the slip of paper used for that purpose, they 
had sufficiently identified him as one of the persons referred to in 
the warrant. 
The opinion does not discuss specifically whether the warrant, thus 
applied, is in compliance with the constitutional requirement of "a 
special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or 
seizure."H It is clear that a blank or "John Doe" warrant of arrest 
is iIIegaJ.15 It is likely that if the true name of a person is known, it 
10346 Mass. 496, 194 N.E.2d 390 (1963). 
11 G.L., c. 271, §17. 
121964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 197 N.E.2d 668. 
13 The warrant was issued under authority of G.L., c. 271, §23. 
14 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XIV. In 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§10.2, at 111-112, the present writer regarded Commonwealth v. Berwick, 346 Mass. 
5, 189 N.E.2d 846 (1963), as a case in which the Court sustained an arrest for 
violation of ,the registering-bets statute on the basis of probable cause and treated 
an arrest warrant which ,the officers had obtained as surplusage. In the light of 
Commonwealth v. Mekalian, supra note lO, this was not correct. The language of 
the Court in ,that case must be taken to mean ,~hat the police officer's recognition 
of a paper protruding. from Berwick's pocket as a record of bets sufficiently.identi-
fied Berwick as one of the class of persons described in the warrant as persons to 
be arrested. The opinion, however, does not indicate ,that the Court had con-
sidered the constitutional sufficiency of the warrant's description of persons to be 
arrested. 
15 Commonwealth v. Crotty, lO Allen 403 (Mass. 1865). 
6
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must be inserted in the warrant.16 It is equally clear that if the name 
of the person is not known, the warrant may contain an adequate 
description of him.17 What constitutes an adequate description has 
not been spelled out in the reported cases. 
It should be noted in this connection that the 1964 Legislature re-
wrote the general warrant statute.18 Instead of sixteen classifications 
of things for which search warrants may be issued, the new statute 
specifies four, viz., the fruits of a crime, instrumentalities of com-
mitting a crime, property the possession of which is unlawful, or 
which is possessed for an unlawful purpose, and dead bodies of human 
beings. The amendment also spells out in greater detail than formerly 
the requirement that warrants be supported by sufficient affidavits. 
§ll.~. Right to counsel: Harmless error. In 1963 the Supreme 
Court of the United States handed down Gideon v. Wainwright,l 
holding that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case is en-
titled to court-appointed counsel, regardless of the limitations of 
this right announced earlier in cases such as Betts v. Brady.2 This 
decision set off a chain reaction of detailed examination of the scope 
of the rights of a suspect or an accused to the assistance of counsel 
and to other aids in his defense. 
On December 21, 1962, the Supreme Judicial Court anticipated 
Gideon by promulgating Rule 10 of its General Rules, which directed 
the appointment of counsel in the Superior Court for defendants 
in noncapital felony cases (such counsel in capital cases had long 
been provided for by statuteS) unless the accused waived the right 
after having been advised of it by the court. The court was also 
authorized to extend similar treatment to defendants accused of other 
crimes if in the judgment of the court the gravity of the charge is 
such as to require representation by counsel. After Gideon the Court 
amended Rule 10 on June 29, 1964. Under the amendment the 
right to counsel extends to every criminal case in which a sentence 
of imprisonment could be imposed. Thus its application is no 
longer limited to cases pending in the Superior Court. The right 
to assigned counsel is limited to cases in which the defendant is 
unable to obtain counsel, as determined by the judge after inter-
rogation of the defendant. 
Of course, the assistance of counsel in pretrial investigation and 
preparation, and in the conduct of the trial, is extremely important.4 
16 West v. Cabell. 155 U.S. 78. 14 Sup. Ct. 752. 58 L. Ed. 645 (1895). 
17 Commonwealth v. Crotty. supra note 15. 
18 G.L .• c. 276. §§1-7. amended by Acts of 1964. c. 557. §§1-7. 
§IU. 1572 U.S. 555. 85 Sup. Ct. 792.9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1965). 
2516 U.s. 455. 62 Sup. Ct. 1252. 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1941). 
S G.L .• c. 277. §§47. 55. 56. 
4 See. e.g .• Anthony Lewis. Gideon's Trumpet (1964). in which there is a dramatic 
comparison of the first trial of the petitioner in Gideon v. Wainwright. supra note 
I, at which he appeared pro se and his subsequent trial, in which he was repre-
sented by counsel and was acquitted. 
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It is, however, probably not an overstatement to say that most 
criminal cases in which conviction results are lost in the police 
station, before the accused is brought into court. Law enforcement 
officers, skilled in the art of interrogation, frequently obtain from 
the lips of the accused statements which are sufficient to convict, 
although there is not enough other evidence to support a finding 
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Certainly, not all such persons 
are aware of their right to remain silent, or of the circumstances in 
which silence may give rise to an adverse inference. 
Legislation designed to minimize the disadvantage of an accused 
is found in the provision5 that an arrested person shall be entitled 
to use the telephone to communicate with his family or friends, 
or to arrange for release on bail, or to engage the services of an 
attorney. The statute recites that the person "shall be informed 
forthwith upon his arrival at such station or place of detention, of 
his right to so use the telephone." In Commonwealth v. Bouchard6 
it appeared that there had been delay, after arrest and arrival at 
the police station, in informing the accused of his right of access to 
the telephone, and at the trial the defendant claimed that for this 
reason he was entitled to a finding of "not guilty." The record, 
however, did not indicate that the delay had in any way prejudiced 
the accused in the making of his defense. The Court overruled 
exceptions to the trial court's rejection of the defendant's claim for 
this reason. It went on, however, to indicate that if the delay had 
been prejudicial, as if, for example, during the period of delay the 
defendant had confessed, or made admissions or other damaging 
statements, the appropriate sanction would be exclusion of such 
statements from evidence, in line with the pattern developed for 
comparable situations by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in such cases as McNabb v. United States.7 
This "harmless error" approach of the Court was suggested by a 
slightly earlier decision in Commonwealth v. O'Leary,S which in-
volved, possibly, denial of a constitutional right. The defendant 
there, prior to the 1964 amendment of Rule 10, was complained of 
in a district court on serious charges of violation of the motor vehicle 
laws. At a probable cause hearing he was not represented by counsel, 
and the court did not advise him of his right to counsel, nor inquire 
as to his indigence. The defendant was bound over to the grand 
jury, which indicted. In the Superior Court the defendant filed 
a plea in abatement, based upon the failure of the district judge 
to provide counsel. Upon report, the Court ruled that the plea 
should be overruled. The opinion pointed out that the defendant 
was not prejudiced in any way by the nonpresence of counsel and 
was completely free in the Superior Court to raise any defense which 
5 C.L., c. 276, §33A, as amended by Acts of 196!l, c. 212. 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 727, 198 N.E.2d 411. 
7 !l18 U.S. !l!l2, 6!l Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1942). 
S 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh.689, 198 N.E.2d 40!l. 
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would have been available to him had the district court episode 
not occurred. 
On the surface, the Supreme Judicial Court's approach in these 
cases, particularly in O'Leary, might seem inconsistent with doctrine 
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States both before 
and after Gideon. Hamilton v. Alabama9 and White v. Maryland10 
were both cases in which defendants had been without counsel at 
their preliminary hearings. Convictions were set aside in both cases, 
and in each case the Court recited, "We do not stop to determine 
whether prejudice resulted." In Hamilton, however, it appeared 
that under Alabama practice certain special pleas could be entered 
as of right only at the preliminary hearing, and although the de-
fendant had made a plea of not guilty, there was no assurance that 
he had made an intelligent waiver of his right to make other pleas. 
The Court simply refused to inquire whether, if he had had the 
assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing, he would have 
pleaded differently. In White, the defendant pleaded guilty at the 
preliminary hearing, when he had no counsel. This plea was offered 
in evidence against him at the trial, after he had pleaded not guilty, 
and not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, in each case the 
defendant, without having had the benefit of counsel's advice, 
entered a plea which could have prejudiced him. In O'Leary, on 
the other hand, the defendant stood mute at the probable cause 
hearing, and this could in no way have been prejudicial to his 
defense. 
It would be dangerous to apply the "harmless error" doctrine in 
a doctrinaire way. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Harrisp where the 
secrecy of the grand jury was invaded by the presence before it of 
unauthorized persons, the indictment was quashed, even without 
a showing of any specific prejudice suffered by the defendant named 
in the indictment. While the Court there did not so spell it out, 
it could have been said that it was not made to appear, as it was 
in Bouchard and O'Leary, that prejudice to the defendant did not 
result, or could not have resulted. 
The right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel prior 
to trial was involved in Commonwealth v. McCarthy.12 A man 
was shot to death, and McCarthy was indicted for murder. He fled the 
jurisdiction, and, while his whereabouts were unknown, his mother 
retained an attorney to represent him. More than six months later 
McCarthy was apprehended in Illinois, where he was interviewed by 
two Boston police officers. One of the officers knew that McCarthy 
had a Boston attorney. During the interrogation McCarthy made 
some damaging statements which were used against him at his trial, 
in which he was found guilty of murder in the second degree. The 
9368 U.S. 52. 82 Sup. Ct. 157. 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961). 
103711 U.S. 59. 83 Sup. Ct. 1050. 10 L. Ed. 2d 193 (191;3). 
112111 Mass. 584. 121 N.E. 409 (1919). 
12 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1133. 200 N.E.2d 264. 
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Supreme Judicial Court, relying upon Massiah v. United States,13 
reversed, holding that police interrogation of an accused after his 
indictment, in the absence of counsel, is forbidden. Although Massiah 
was based specifically upon the Sixth Amendment, the Court felt 
that, reading it in the light of Gideon v. Wainwright,14 it announced 
a "constitutional principle"15 binding upon state governments, as 
well as upon the Federal Government. At some time during the police 
interrogation, McCarthy asked for counsel, but it was not made 
clear whether this was before or after he had made the damaging 
statements. In view of the breadth of the decision, it does not 
appear to make any difference when, or even whether, he asked 
for an attorney. Nor does it appear to be a significant fact that one 
of the interrogating officers was aware that counsel had been retained 
for the accused. 
Whether these factors, or any of them, would be significant in a 
different context remains to be decided. Escobedo v. Illinois,HI 
decided a few weeks after Massiah, involved pre-indictment question-
ing of a suspect at the police station. He had retained counsel, 
and he stated that he would like to have advice from his lawyer. The 
attorney went to the police station and asked to see his client. Both 
requests were refused by the police; the accused finally made 
damaging statements which were used against him at his trial, and 
he was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, but 
the scope of the principle upon which it based its decision is not 
clear. Earlier decisions17 had held that the right to have counsel 
in the police station (perhaps like the pre-Gideon right to have assigned 
counsel at a trial) is not absolute, but varies according to the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. The Court did not flatly over-
rule this doctrine. It suggested, at one point,1S a distinction 
between an investigation which is part of "a general inquiry into 
an unsolved crime" and one which "has begun to focus on a particular 
suspect." In the latter event, "when the process shifts from in-
vestigatory to accusatory - when its focus is on the accused and its 
purpose is to elicit a confession - our adversary system begins to 
operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be 
permitted to consult with his lawyer."19 On the other hand, it 
seems to be significant that the police failed to warn the accused 
of his right to remain silent,20 and there is a rather equivocal state-
ment that, to the extent that the earlier cases "may be inconsistent 
111377 U.S. 201, 84 Sup. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1964). 
14 372 Mass. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). 
15 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1133, 1136, 200 N.E.2d 264, 266. 
16378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964). 
17 Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 78 Sup. Ct. 1297, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1523 (1958); 
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 Sup. Ct. 1287, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1448 (1958); 
Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 78 Sup. Ct. 1354,2 L. Ed. 2d 1443 (1958). 
18378 U.S. 478, 490,84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1765, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 985 (1964). 
19Id. at 492, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1766, 12 L. Ed. 2d a<t 987. 
20Id. 3>t 485, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1762, 1765, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 983, 986. 
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with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded 
as controlling."21 Thus, whether Escobedo announces a rule for 
a particular fact situation or, like Gideon, establishes a broad principle 
of universal post-arrest right, to the assistance of cO\lnsel, and if the 
latter, what are the specifics of the principle, are questions which 
can be expected to tax the talents of judges and advocates in the 
immediate future. 
One other decision in this general area during the 1964 SURVEY 
year calls for brief mention. LaMorre v. Superintendent of Bridge-
water State Hospital22 was a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain the 
release of one who had been committed under General Laws, Chapter 
123A, as a sexually dangerous person. The proceeding was based, 
in part, on the fact that at some preliminary stages of the commitment 
proceedings LaMorre had not been represented by counsel. The 
relief sought was refused. The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out 
that this statute is not penal and stated that a person proceeded 
against under it is not necessarily invested with the same rights 
to be represented by counsel as is a defendant in a criminal case. 
This may be so, although almost certainly such a person is entitled to 
Fourteenth Amendment due process.28 Actually, it was not necessary 
to probe into the distinction, if any, in the right to counsel in the 
different types of proceeding, since there was no actual prejudice 
to the defendant, and he was, in fact, represented by counsel at the 
crucial point in the proceedings, the hearing to determine whether 
he was a sexually dangerous person. 
§1l.4. Due process and equal protection: Pressure for guilty pleas. 
Of all the criminal prosecutions which result in conviction, the 
overwhelming majority are cases in which the defendants have pleaded 
guilty.1 Some of these guilty pleas, particularly in the instances 
of lesser offenses, are the products of a "pay up and get it done 
with" mentality. Some are the consequence of bargaining between 
prosecution 'and defense counsel for reduction of the gravity of, the 
charges. Whatever the reasons for such pleas, it is statistically clear 
that the efficient operation of the existing machinery for the admin-
istration of criminal justice requires continuance of roughly the 
present ratio of uncontested to contested cases. Courts and prose-
21Id. at 492, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1766, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 987. 
221964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 958, 199 N.E.2d 204. 
28 Defective delinquents and mental defectives proceeded against under G.L., c. 
123, §1l3 (proceedings under this statute, like those under G.L., c. 123A, being 
remedial, not penal, Dubois, Petitioner, 331 Mass. 575, 126 N.E.2d 368 (1954», are 
entitled to the due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. O'Leary, 
Petitioner, 325 Mass. 179,89 N.E.2d 769 (1950). 
§1l.4. 1 See Statistical Report of the Commissioner of Correction for ,the Year 
Ending December 31, 1961, Pub. Doc. No. 115, 58, 82. In ,the Superior Court 
there were 1086 convictions after pleas of not guilty; 6514 convictions after pleas of 
guilty. In the district courts there were 28,236 convictions after pleas of not guilty; 
195,478 convictions after pleas of guilty. 
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cuting offices would be swamped if an appreciable additional number 
of cases were to go to trial. 
While there are substantial social pressures to preserve the status 
quo in this respect, there is a substantial individual interest in 
preserving the right of an accused to insist that, before he is sub-
jected to penal sanctions, his guilt be proved in an adversary proceed-
ing. Reconciliation of these sometimes competing interests often 
requires the establishment of a delicate balance. Three cases in-
volving this problem came up during the 1964 SURVEY year. 
Commonwealth v. Marder2 involved the legislationS by which 
traffic rules, such as parking regulations, are sanctioned. This pro-
vides, in substance, that a violator may stand trial in a criminal 
court and, if found guilty, be subjected to a fine of not more than 
twenty-five dollars. He may, at his option, informally "confess" 
and pay a fine computed according to an administratively established 
schedule, but not in excess of fifteen dollars. The optional procedure 
is declared not to be criminal. Marder elected to stand trial on a 
criminal complain~ for illegal parking, was found guilty, and was 
fined twenty-five dollars. He contended that the statutory pattern 
denied him due process and equal protection, in that i~ tended to 
coerce him into waiver of his right to trial by holding out the induce-
ments of a potentially smaller penalty and freedom from taint of 
criminality. The Court rejected the contentions, holding that the 
relatively minor seriousness of the offenses and of the penalties justified 
the invention and utilization of this device to relieve the burdens of the 
criminal courts and to facilitate the effective administration of the traf-
fic laws. The Court did not pause to consider how broad is the category 
of petty offenses, for which the individual interest in accessibility of 
adversary hearing may be subordinated to the general interest in 
administrative convenience. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, three justices, one less than the number required 
to note probable jurisdiction, voted to take the case. 
Argued the same day as Marder, and decided the same day as that 
case, was Letters v. Commonwealth.4 There, several persons were 
on trial under indictments for rape, being accessory before the fact 
of rape, conspiracy to rape, and robbery. After a prosecution witness 
testified that he had seen one of the defendants rape the victim 
and take her pocketbook, the judge called counsel into his lobby. 
There, according to the accounts given by the attorneys to their 
clients and the latters' families, the judge stated that, as he had 
indicated at earlier conferences, if the defendants remained on trial 
and made it necessary for the victim to testify, he would impose 
maximum sentences, to be served consecutively, in the event of 
2!!46 Mass. 408, 19!! N.E.2d 695 (1963). Appeal dismissed for want of a sub· 
stantia1 federal question sub nom. Marder v. Massachusetts, !!77 U.S. 407, 84 Sup. 
Ct. 1626, 12 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1964). 
S G.L., c. 90, §§20, 20A. 
4!!46 Mass. 403, 19!! N.E.2d 578 (196!!). 
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verdicts of guilty. The defendants thereupon changed their pleas 
to guilty and were sentenced. Upon writs of error, the judgments 
were reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court felt that the trial judge's 
threats of severity of punishment in the event of conviction, even 
though motivated by the humanitarian desire to protect the innocent 
victim, constituted a forbidden coercion of the defendants to waive 
their right to require the prosecution to prove the cases against them. 
The line between the licit and the illicit in this respect can be very 
fine. An unidentified minority of the Court dissented, in part, for 
unarticulated reasons. This minority, while agreeing as to one 
of the defendants, disagreed as to another. The one defendant 
was reluctant to change his plea because of a belief that his attempted 
abandonment of the joint venture (successive rapes by different, de-
fendants were involved) constituted matter in mitigation. The other 
defendant made no such claim and stated to his attorney, "I did 
do it." It is difficult to see how these facts make a significant differ-
ence in the coercive impact of the trial judge's expressed attitude. It 
would have made for clarification of doctrine had the minority of 
the Court overcome the traditional disinclination of members of 
the Court to write dissenting opinions. 
The third case was Keenan v. Commonwealth.1i Keenan, an illiterate, 
was indicted for murder and assault with intent to murder. There 
were several conferences between his counsel and the prosecutor. 
Keenan's mother and a family friend were present at some of these. 
There was a consensus that the only possible defense was insanity 
(based upon Keenan's state of intoxication at the time of the killing). 
The prosecutor pointed out, and defense counsel apparently agreed, 
that if such a plea were successful, the probable disposition would be 
commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital, which might cause psy-
chiatric damage to Keenan. The prosecutor said that if Keenan 
would plead guilty to murder in the second degree and would learn 
to read and write while in prison and otherwise behave himself, 
the prosecutor would "reopen the case" in five to seven years wfth 
a view to having Keenan released. (The Court regarded this as 
an undertaking, so understood by Keenan's attorney, to make recom-
mendations to the parole board or to the chief executive.) On 
the joint recommendation of his counsel, his mother, and the family 
friend, Keenan pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Both the prosecutor and the defense counsel subsequently 
died. After spending eight years in prison, and without any apparent 
prospect of official intervention for his release, Keenan petitioned 
for writ of error, attacking the validity of the judgment against him. 
The Court concluded that, in the circumstances, the conduct of the 
prosecutor could not be classified as improper coercion. This was 
simply a case of defense counsel's negotiating for as good a bargain 
as he could strike with the prosecutor. The bargain, having been 
made in good faith on both sides, could not, because of supervening 
Ii 346 Mass. 534, 194 N.E.2d 637 (1963). 
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events, be given the effect of vitiating Keenan's waiver of his right 
to trial. The Court indicated that the proper course would be to 
apply to the successor prosecutor and to other public authorities 
and ask them to give consideration to the undertaking of the 
original prosecutor.6 
§11.5. Police power regulation: Constitutional limits. Whether ac-
tion of the state or of one of its municipal subdivisions went beyond 
the limits of the police power was an issue tendered in several of 
the cases decided during the 1964 SURVEY year. 
Anton's of Reading, Inc. v. Town of Readingl involved a town 
by-law which regulated the operation of laundromats. Among other 
restrictions was a prohibition of operating between the hours of 
midnight and 6 A.M. unless an attendant was present. This was 
asserted to be an improper limitation upon the right to engage in 
a lawful calling, but the Supreme Judicial Court did not agree. It 
held that the authorities could properly form the judgment that the 
regulation would have the effect of a deterrent of crime. They 
could have reasoned that an open laundromat is a likely situs of 
a crime, particularly late at night, and that the presence of an 
attendant would tend to reduce the likelihood of crime being com-
mitted. The prohibition was thus an advancement of the public 
interest in the abatement of criminal activity. 
A similar approach led to the sustaining of the regulation involved 
in Chief of the Fire Department of Boston v. Sutherland Apart-
ments, Inc.2 That regulation provided that when a building has 
an inner court not protected by a roof, it must have a substantial 
barrier or parapet at least thirty inches high. This was held to be 
a proper fire-prevention measure. The argument was that a parapet 
would protect a fireman from a fall into the inner court, a fireman 
thus protected would be less likely to be injured from such a fall, 
a fireman less likely to be injured is more likely to maintain his 
efficiency, and the more likely the maintenance of the efficiency of 
the fireman, the less likely the spread of conflagration. 
These cases are applications of the health-safety-morals thesis, as 
classically stated in Commonwealth v. Alger:8 when conduct, or use 
of property, has potential physical impact inimical to the public 
interest, public authority may invoke the principle of sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas to prohibit the activity or the use. When the 
impact is primarily economic, however, there has sometimes been 
judicial reluctance to recognize legislative competence to control.4 
There were at least traces of such reluctance in two cases handed 
down during the 196~ SURVEY year. 
6 Inquiry, nearly a year a£ter the date of the decision, revealed that Keenan was 
still in custody. 
§11.5. 1346 Mass. 575, 195 N.E.2d 80 (1964). 
2346 Mass. 685, 195 N.E.2d 536 (1964). 
37 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851). 
41959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.2. 
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The statutory!! prohibition of delivery of food products that are 
in imitation or resemblance of cream was involved in Aeration Proc-
esses, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health.6 Instantblend is a 
vegetable product that superficially resembles cream and that, when 
poured into coffee, cannot readily be distinguished by taste from 
cream. The manufacturer supplied it, in bulk, to public and 
employer-maintained eating places, where it was served to purchasers 
of coffee as cream is customarily served. Although the product is 
a nutritious one, the Court had no difficulty in ruling, as a matter 
of statutory construction, that it was a forbidden imitation of cream. 
The Court likewise found no merit in the manufacturer's contention 
that the prohibition of distribution of its product was in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. The opinion7 
simply recited the familiar proposition that the police power extends 
to the prevention of consumer confusion. A footnote,S however, 
intimates a possible reservation, to the effect that if there is available 
an alternative means of avoiding consumer confusion (e.g., adequate 
labelling of the container in which the product is sold), the legislature 
might be required to elect the less drastic means of regulation, rather 
than impose a flat prohibition. This was pure dictum in the case, 
since the opinion pointed out that it was clear on the record that 
labelling would be inadequate to eliminate consumer confusion under 
the method of distribution being considered in the case. 
Whether alternative and less burdensome methods of attaining a 
legislative end are available, and whether their availability con-
stitutes a limitation upon the regulatory power of government, are 
among the most difficult problems of constitutional law. There is 
substantial authority. to the effect that if the legislature can protect 
the public interest by means less restrictive upon individual freedom, 
it must elect that alternative.e There is, however, equally substantial 
authority to the effect that it is for the legislature, not the courts, 
to make an evaluation of the efficacy of the means selected to 
accomplish the end.10 It has been suggestedll that the "reasonable 
Ii G.L., c. 94, §187. This section characterizes as misbranded, food that is in imita-
tion of any other food, unless it is labelled as imitation. But it does not permit 
even labelled imitations of foods for which legal standards have been set. Id. §12, 
establishes milk fat content standards for cream. Id. §§189A, 191, provide civil and 
criminal sanctions for delivery of misbranded foods. 
6346 Mass. 546, 194 N.E.2d 8!18 (196!1). 
7Id. at 554, 194 N.E.2d at 84!1. 
SId. at 554 n.8, 194 N.E.2d at 843 n.8. 
e Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, !l4O U.S. 349, 7l Sup. Ct. 295, 95 L. Ed. 329 (1951); 
Liggett Co. v. Baldrige, 278 U.S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57, 7!1 L. Ed. 204 (1928); cf. 
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 46 Sup. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 654 (1926). 
10 Carolene Produots Co. v. United States, 3211 U.S. 18, 65 Sup. Ct. I, 89 L. Ed. 15 
(1944); Purity Extract Be Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, !l3 Sup. Ct. 44, 57 L. Ed. 
184 (1912). 
11 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, !l40 U.S. 349, !l58, 
7l Sup. Ct. 295, 299-!l00, 95 L. Ed. !l29, !I!I5 (1951). 
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alternative" approach should be limited to cases involving the "pre-
ferred freedoms."12 On the other hand, the very concept of the 
preferred freedoms has been strenuously doubted.18 Perhaps the 
significance of an alternative means boils down to the use of a 
judicial "intuition of experience."14 
As noted in an earlier section, a more restrictive view of the scope 
of legislative power was taken in Paddock v. Brookline.15 There the 
Court was unable to perceive a public purpose in the waiver, for the 
benefit of a particular litigant, of the statutory requirement of giving 
notice of injury from a defect in a public way as a prerequisite to 
maintaining such action. It therefore felt no necessity to evaluate 
the exposure of the defendant town to liability as a means to attain 
a public purpose. Had the Court regarded the statutory waiver as 
an ad hoc removal of a residual link to the anachronistic doctrine 
of municipal nonliability in tort,16 it might well have been able to 
find a public purpose. Whether, in such case, it would have found 
the exposure of the town to potential economic loss disproportionate 
to the public interest sought to be advanced must remain a matter 
of speculation. 
One definite limitation upon the power of government is that when 
property of an individual is appropriated to public uses, he must' 
be paid reasonable compensation.17 This is an appealing general-
ization, but its concrete meaning is impossible to define with pre-
cision. Every restriction upon the use of property is to some extent 
an appropriation, but it is clear that there are innumerable restric-
tions imposed in the public interest for which compensation need 
not be made. It has been held, for example, that a zoning law 
establishing one acre as the minimum size of a building lot in a 
residential district was not, in the circumstances, a compensable 
appropriation of the owner's property in the constitutional sense.18 
Yet the Court, while recognizing this, held in Aronson v. Town of 
Sharon19 that prescription of minimum lot size of 100,000 square 
feet, with minimum width of 200 feet, could not be enforced without 
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Quoting Mr. Justice 
12 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 
783 n.4, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 1241-1242 n.4 (1938). 
18 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90, 69 
Sup. Ct. 448, 455, 93 L. Ed. 513, 524, 10 A.L.R.2d 608, 618-619 (1949). 
14 Mr. Justice Holmes once described the judgments of a board of assessors on 
evidence as to property values as follows: "They express an intuition of experience 
which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions,-
impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth." 
Chicago, B. &: Q.R.R. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598, 27 Sup. Ct. 326, 329, 51 L. Ed. 
636, 640 (1907). . 
151964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 501, 197 N.E.2d 321, noted in §11.1 supra. 
16 Whalen v. Worcester Electric Light Co., 307 Mass. 169, 29 N.E.2d 763 (1940). 
17 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X. 
18 Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 141 A.L.R. 688 (1942). 
19346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964). 
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Holmes,20 the Court stated that the difference between regulation 
and taking is a matter of degree, and that the zoning law here 
involved had gone over the line of demarcation. This, of course, 
is a situation in which a court, although always with deference to 
legislative judgment, must make a value judgment of its own. Any 
other approach would remove the "just compensation for property 
taken" provisions of constitutions out of the realm of judicial review. 
§11.6. Miscellaneous decisions. The docket of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court during the 1964 SURVEY year included cases that seemed 
to present an unusually large number of constitutional issues. The 
cases mentioned below do not appear to require extended discussion 
at this time, but they are significant enough to warrant notation. 
Issues of federalism came up in three cases. In Edgar H. Wood 
Associates, Inc. v. Skene l the issue was whether two recent decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the United States2 had established that 
federal patent and copyright laws so pre-empt the field that state 
law is not competent to forbid the copying by a competitor of an 
architect's noncopyrighted plans for the construction of a building. 
The Massachusetts Court held that the field of common law copy-
right, i.e., protection of unpublished material, is not pre-empted 
and may be dealt with by state law. The Court then went on to 
discuss what is meant by publica ton of building plans and concluded 
that such plans are not placed in the public domain by filing them 
in the local building department either for purposes of obtaining a 
building permit, or at the time when a building is constructed from 
them. 
The foreign corporation excise3 is applicable only to those who 
"do business" in the Commonwealth. The issue in Delph Broker-
age Co. v. State Tax Commission4 was whether an Indiana corporation 
was in this category. The company's main office was in Indianapolis, 
but it owned furniture and rented office space in Boston, and it 
employed two salesmen and a secretary-receptionist there. Its sole 
activities in Massachusetts were solicitations of offers to buy, from 
out-of-state sellers, goods that were located in other states. When 
offers were obtained they were sent to Indianapolis, and the main 
office submitted them to potential sellers, who could accept or reject 
them. When offers were accepted the goods were shipped directly 
by the seller to the buyer, and the buyer paid the seller directly. The 
20 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 160, 67 
L. Ed. 322, 326, 28 A.L.R. 1321, 1325-1326 (1922). 
§11.6. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 647, 197 N.E.2d 886. 
2 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiflel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 Sup. Ct. 784, 11 L. Ed. 2d 
661 (1964), rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973, 84 Sup. Ct. 1131, 12 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1964); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 84 Sup. Ct. 779, 11 L. Ed. 2d 
669, both noted 6 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 138 (1964). 
3 G.L., c. 63, §39. 
4347 Mass. 64, 196 N.E.2d 628 (1964). 
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buyers sent brokerage commissions direct to the Indianapolis office. 
(Any commissions sent to the Boston office were forwarded to Indian-
apolis.) The Court held, reversing the Appellate Tax Board, that 
these activities were purely interstate commerce and so were not 
subject to the tax. 
Another Commerce Clause case was Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health/j This involved the statute6 
that imposes upon persons outside the Commonwealth who ship 
"harmful drugs"7 into the Commonwealth an annual license tax of 
twenty-five dollars for each place of business outside the Common-
wealth belonging to such person. A companion statuteS imposes 
an annual license tax on Massachusetts manufacturers of "harmful 
drugs," independent of the number of places of business. Since the 
out-of-state operator with more than one place of business was subject 
to a higher license tax than his Massachusetts competitor with the 
same or a greater number of places of business, the st,atute was held 
to discriminate against him simply because he is out-of-state. Such 
treatment is forbidden by the Commerce Clause. By deciding the 
case on this ground the Court avoided the necessity of examining 
some more basic problems with respect to the license tax. In doing 
so, it decided a novel point with respect to the plaintiff's standing 
to raise the question. The plaintiff actually had only one place of 
business, but, said the Court, if its claim were not recognized it 
would have to pay the tax, and this would place it at a disadvantage 
in respect to other out-of-state competitors who have more than one 
place of business and thus have the right 'to raise the question. 
What constitutes "public purpose" in connection with appropria-
tions of public funds and with exercise of the power of eminent 
domain is a question that came up in two contexts. 
There was a legislative proposal to subsidize the election campaigns 
of the various political parties by appropriating a sum of money to 
be distributed to the state committees of the parties in described 
proportions. The House requested an advisory opinion as to 
whether the proposal would be repugnant to the Sixty-second Amend-
ment of the State Constitution, which forbids the pledge of the credit 
of the Commonwealth to any private individual or association. The 
Justices advised9 that the proposal would not be subject to the 
objection named, because it was a proposal for an appropriation, 
not a pledge of credit. The opinion went on, however, to point 
out that there might be a question as to the public purpose of the 
proposal. Another request for an advisory opinion was sent over, 
5346 Mass. 606, 195 N.E.2d 74 (1964). 
6 G.L., c. 94, §187F. 
7 I.e., drugs that federal law requires to be labelled, "Caution - Federal law 
prohibits dispensing without prescription." Id. §187A. 
SId. §187E. 
9 Opinion of the Justices, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 373, 196 N.E.2d 912. 
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this time inquiring specifically whether the proposed appropriation 
would be for a public purpose. The reply was in the negative.10 
Relying mainly upon an earlier advisory opinion,11 the Justices ruled 
that disbursement of public funds through persons who are not 
public officers is impermissible under the "public purpose" limitation 
on appropriations. Justice Spiegel disagreed. He felt that state 
committees of political parties should not be classified as public 
officers for some purposes, but that there was no constit,utional 
objection to entrusting such committees with disbursements under 
the proposed plan. He argued that the proper question to be 
considered was whether subsidy of political election campaigns was 
a public purpose, and that that question should have an affirmative 
answer. 
The other public purpose case grew out of a land taking by the 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.12 Robie v. Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority18 came up when the Authority took land belonging to 
the New York Central Railroad for a portion of its turnpike, and 
then took Robie's adjoining land, not for part of the turnpike, 
but for relocation of the railroad's operations formerly carried on 
in the area taken for turnpike purposes. After contending, unsuccess-
fully, that the taking was in excess of the authority's powers, Robie 
argued that to the extent that it authorized the taking, the enabling 
statute was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the taking was 
for a sufficient public purpose, in that it furthered the public interest 
in adequate railroad accommodations. The principle of Salisbury 
Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth,14 forbidding taking 
for resale to a purely private individual, was inapplicable. 
The Crime Commission,15 its organization, and its functioning were 
before the Court in Sheridan v. Gardner.H) The Court rejected the 
argument that the Commission, as far as it performs the legislative 
function of investigating in aid of prospective legislation, stood in 
violation of the constitutional requirement of separation of powers17 
in that (1) its members were appointed by the governor, rather than 
by the legislative branch, and (2) the legislature had delegated to 
nonlegislators the legislative investigating power. The landmark 
case of Attorney General v. Brissenden18 was the basic authority for 
these conclusions. Reserved for decision in a possible future case 
that would present the issue more directly was the issue of whether 
the Commission's enabling legislation violated the separation of 
powers doctrine and also Article XII of the Declaration of Rights, 
10 Opinion of the JUlitices, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 197 N.E.2d 691. 
11 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 777, 150 N.E.2d 693 (1958). 
12 Created by Acts of 1952, c. 354. 
181964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1067, 199 N.E.2d 914. 
14 215 Mass. 371, 102 N.E. 619 (1913). 
15 Created by Resolves of 1962, c. 146. 
16347 Mass. 8, 196 N.E.2d 303 (1964). 
17 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XXX. 
18271 Mass. 172, 171 N.E. 82 (1930). 
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if it authorized the Commission to institute criminal proceedings 
relevant to matters turned up by its investigations. The case before 
the Court was a suit by one who had been summoned to testify 
before the Commission as a witness. It did not appear that the 
Commission had instituted criminal proceedings against him, and 
so it was held that he did not have standing to raise the particular 
issue at the time. 
Another Crime Commission case was Gardner v. Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority.19 A subpoena issued by the Commission was 
challenged on the ground, among others, that it looked to an illegal 
"fishing expedition."20 The Court rejected the challenge, adopting 
the position of the Supreme Court of the United States, of which 
it said, " ... the rules as to the permissible breadth of summonses 
issued by administrative bodies have been extended in more recent 
cases."21 
The referendum provisions of the State Constitution22 are to the 
effect that laws subject to referendum, except those declared to be 
emergency laws, do not take effect until at least ninety days after 
enactment. A further provision is that an emergency law must 
contain a preamble "setting forth the facts constituting the emer-
gency." In Molesworth v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,28 a ques-
tion was presented asking whether a statute24 providing for an 
immediate increase in salary and expense allowances for members of 
the General Court had an adequate preamble. A legislative practice 
of long standing has been to recite that deferred operation of an 
act would tend to defeat its purpose, and it is therefore declared to be 
an emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public convenience. Whether such a formula, or some adaptation 
thereof, sufficiently sets forth the facts constituting an emergency 
was the issue tendered. Justices Kirk and Spiegel felt that this was 
not a justiciable issue, and that the legislative determination of the 
sufficiency of the preamble was conclusive. The majority of the 
Court, however, felt that the issue was justiciable and proceeded 
to rule, on the merits, that the preamble was adequate. Justice 
19 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 199 N.E.2d 186. 
20 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 
336, 68 L. Ed. 696 (1924). 
211964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 889-890, 199 N.E.2d 186, 193, citing Civil Aeronautics 
Board v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 77 Sup. Ct. 804, 1 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1957); Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 Sup. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614, 166 
A.L.R. 531 (1946); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 63 Sup. Ct. 339, 
87 L. Ed. 424 (1943). 
22 Mass. Const., Amend. Art. XLVIII, as further amended by Amend. Art. LXVII 
(and by other amendments not here relevant). 
23347 Mass. 47, 196 N.E.2d 312 (1964). In a subsequent case the Court ruled 
that a referendum petition concerning the subject matter involved in this case 
should be placed on the ballot at the ensuing general election. Molesworth v. State 
Ballot Law Commission, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1149,200 N.E.2d 583. At the election 
of November 3, 1964, the proponents of the referendum prevailed. 
24 Acts of 1963, c. 506. 
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Whittemore dissented, feeling that the wording of the preamble should 
have been more specific. 
In an advisory opinion,25 the Justices again26 underscored the 
inadequacy of many submissions of requests for such opinions. A 
proposed statute would have provided, as to premiums charged under 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield hospital and medical service insurance 
plans, that a subscriber who retired after age sixty-five would not 
be required to pay a higher premium than individuals covered under 
a group plan. The Justices were asked whether the proposal would 
be lacking in constitutional equal protection. Pointing out that 
there was no record, or other source of factual information, upon 
which adequate judgment of the classifications involved could be 
based, the Justices replied, simply, that nothing appeared on the 
face of the proposal that could be said to deny equal protection. 
Equal protection and establishment of religion were among the 
issues involved in Sisters of the Holy Cross v. Town of Brookline.27 
The plaintiff corporation, a religious order, operates Cardinal 
Cushing College. It proposed to construct a college building, but 
a building permit that had been issued was revoked because the 
building plans were not in compliance with a hastily amended 
zoning by-law. The zoning enabling act contains a proviso that 
"no ordinance or by-law which prohibits or limits the use of land 
for any church or other religious purpose or for any educational 
purpose whether public, religious, sectarian, or denominational shall 
be valid."28 It was contended that the proviso denied equal pro-
tection of the laws and constituted an unlawful establishment of 
religion. The Court rejected both contentions. While, clearly, the 
proviso affords different land-use treatment to various landowners 
in the same district, there is no constitutional reason why the legisla-
ture may not make classifications, so long as they are not irrational. 
The peculiar building requirements of religious and educational 
institutions justify putting them in a different category from house-
holders, with respect to zoning restrictions. As to the establishment-
of-religion argument, the Court suggested that although the Con-
stitution forbids active state aid to religious causes, the prohibition 
does not extend to exemptions of such causes from restrictions 
applicable to others. Cases involving tax exemptions for religious 
institutions were said to be in point. In any event, concluded the 
Court, the plaintiff in the present case qualified for the exemption 
as an educational, rather than as a religious institution, and its 
religious orientation did not disqualify it for that exemption. 
25 Opinion of the Justices, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 199 N.E.2d 179. 
26 Opinion of the Justices, 345 Mass. 780, 189 N.E.2d 849 (1863). 
271964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 198 N.E.2d 624. 
28 G.L., c. 4OA, §2. 
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